Abstract-The rapid growth of content distribution on the Internet has brought with it proportional increases in the costs of distributing content. Adding to distribution costs is the fact that digital content is easily duplicable, and hence can be shared in an illicit peer-to-peer (P2P) manner that generates no revenue for the content provider. In this paper, we study whether the content provider can recover lost revenue through a more innovative approach to distribution. In particular, we evaluate the benefits of a hybrid revenue-sharing system that combines a legitimate P2P swarm and a centralized client-server approach. We show how the revenue recovered by the content provider using a server-supported legitimate P2P swarm can exceed that of the monopolistic scheme by an order of magnitude. Our analytical results are obtained in a fluid model, and supported by stochastic simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen the rapid increase of content distribution using the Internet as the medium of delivery [1] . Users and applications expect a low cost for content, but at the same time require high levels of quality of service. However, providing content distribution at a low cost is challenging. The major costs associated with meeting demand at a good quality of service are (i) the high cost of hosting services on the managed infrastructure of CDN [2] , and (ii) the additional costs associated with the fact that digital content is easily duplicable, and hence can be shared in an illicit peer-to-peer (P2P) manner that generates no revenue for the content provider. Together, these factors have led content distributors to search for methods of defraying costs.
One technique that is often suggested for defraying distribution costs is to use legal peer-to-peer (P2P) networks to supplement provider distribution [3] , [4] . It is well documented that the efficient use of P2P methods can result in significant cost reductions from the perspective of ISPs [2] , [5] ; however there are substantial drawbacks as well. Probably the most troublesome is that providers fear losing control of content ownership, in the sense that they are no longer in control of the distribution of the content and worry about feeding illegal P2P activity.
Thus, a key question that must be answered before we can expect mainstream utilization of P2P approaches is: How can users that have obtained content legally be encouraged to reshare it legally? Said in a different way, can mechanisms be designed that ensure legitimate P2P swarms will dominate the illicit P2P swarms?
In this paper, we investigate a "revenue sharing" approach to this issue. Motivated by recent work using lottery schemes to promote societally beneficial conduct [6] , we suggest that users can be motivated to reshare the content legally by allowing them to share the revenue associated with future sales. This can be accomplished through either a lottery scheme or by simply sharing a fraction of the sale price.
Such an approach has two key benefits: First, obviously, this mechanism ensures that users are incentivized to join the legitimate P2P network since they can profit from joining. Second, less obviously, this approach actually damages the illicit P2P network. Specifically, despite the fact that content is free in the illicit P2P network, since most users expect a reasonable quality of service, if the delay in the illegitimate swarm is large they may be willing to use the legitimate P2P network instead. Thus, by encouraging users to reshare legitimately, we are averting them from joining the illicit P2P network, reducing its capacity and performance; thus making it less likely for others to use it.
The natural worry about a revenue sharing approach is that by sharing profits with users, the provider is losing revenue. However, the key insight provided by the results in this paper is that the bootstrapping provided by the second effect described above provides a magnification of the initial revenue sharing "investments", which turns out to provide exponential gains in revenue for the provider even when very little revenue sharing is used.
More specifically, the contribution of this paper is to develop and analyze a model to explore the revenue sharing approach described above. Our model (see Section II) is a fluid model that builds on work studying the capacity of P2P content distribution systems. The key novel component of the model is the competition for users among an illicit P2P system and a legal content distribution network (CDN), which may make use of a supplementary P2P network with revenue sharing. The main results of the paper (see Section III) are Theorems 1 and 2, which highlight the order-ofmagnitude gains in revenue extracted by the provider as a result of participating in revenue sharing. In addition to the analytic results, to validate the insights provided by our asymptotic analysis of the fluid model we also perform numerical experiments of the underlying finite stochastic model. Figures 3(a) , 3(b), 4(a) and 4(b) summarize these experiments, which highlight both that the results obtained in the fluid model are quite predictive for the finite setting and that there are significant beneficial effects of revenue sharing. In particular, the examples that we present indicate that revenue extraction gains between 25% to 180% are possible through appropriate revenue sharing.
There is a significant body of prior work modeling and analyzing P2P systems. Perhaps the most related work from this literature is the work that focuses on server-assisted P2P content distribution networks [7] - [12] in which a central server is used to "boost" P2P systems. This boost is important since pure P2P systems suffer poor performance during initial stages of content distribution. In fact, it is this initially poor performance that our revenue sharing mechanism exploits to ensure that the legitimate P2P network dominates. The key differentiating factor of the current work compared to this work is that we model the impact of competition between legal and illegal swarms on the revenue extraction of a content provider. There has been prior work that focuses on identifying the relative value of content and resources for different users [13] , [14] . For instance, [13] deals with creating a content exchange that goes beyond traditional P2P barter schemes, while [14] attempts to characterize the relative value of peers in terms of their impact on system performance as a function of time. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that considers the question of economics and incentives in hybrid P2P content distribution networks.
II. MODEL OVERVIEW
Our goal is to model the competition between illicit peerto-peer (P2P) distribution and a legitimate content distribution network (CDN), which may make use of its own P2P network. Our model is a fluid model, and there are four main components:
(i) The evolution of the demand for content. As mentioned in the introduction, a key feature of this paper is that we consider a realistic model for the evolution of demand, specifically, the Bass diffusion model. (ii) The model of user behavior, which allows the user to strategically choose between attaining content legally or illegally based on the price and performance of the two options. (iii) The model of the illicit P2P system. (iv) The model of the legal CDN and its possibility to use "revenue sharing". We discuss these each in turn in the following.
A. The evolution of demand
Models of the dynamics of demand growth for innovations date back to the work of Griliches [15] and Bass [16] . The most widely used model for dynamics of demand growth is the Bass diffusion model which describes how new products get adopted as potential users interact with users that have already adopted the product. Such word of mouth interaction between users and potential users is very common in the Internet and we use a version of Bass diffusion model that only has word of mouth spreading.
In our setting we have two key pieces of notation: N , the total size of the population, and I(t), the number of users that are interested in the content at time t. We model that each interested user "attempts" to cause a randomly selected user to become interested in the content. 1 At any time t, 1 Note that these "attempts" should not be interpreted literally, but rather as the natural diffusion of interest in the new content through the population. there are N − I(t) users that could potentially be interested in the content. Thus, the probability of finding such a users is (N − I(t))/N . Assuming that an interested user can interact with other users at rate 1 per unit time, we get that the rate at which interested users increase is given by the following:
The above differential equation can be easily solved and yields the so-called logistic function as its solution.
where I(0) is the number of user that are interested in the content at time t = 0. Though this model is simple, it is a useful qualitative summary of the spread of content. To highlight this, Figure 1 (taken from [11] ) highlights a similar behavior in a data trace from CoralCDN [17] , a CDN hosted at different university sites. The figure shows the cumulative demand for a home video of the Asian Tsunami seen over a month in December 2005. For comparision, the figure on the right shows the model in equation (2) . The qualitative usefulness of the Bass model has been verified empirically in other settings as well. For example, [18] shows that a variant accurately represents the penetration of CDs using data collected internationally [19] . There are many other examples of the use of the Bass model for forecasting the dissemination of innovations [20] - [22] , and hence it can be considered as canonical [23] 2 . Due to space limitations, in this paper we will only present the analysis for a static demand model in which the whole population is interested in the content from time t = 0. However, a more detailed analysis of a time varying approximate Bass model can be found in [24] . Note that the more detailed analysis yields the same asymptotic results presented in Theorems 1 and 2. Additionally, to highlight the generality of the results, we use the Bass model in the simulation results presented at the end of this paper. These results highlight that the qualitative insights given by the analysis hold more generally. Therefore, the analytical model of interest that we use is simply
where T ∞ = ln N .
B. The progression of a user
In order to capture the strategic behavior of users in the face of competition between a legitimate CDN using P2P and an illicit P2P network our model is necessarily complex. Figure 2 provides a broad overview of the user behavior in the system, which we explain in detail in the following. In what follows, we develop a fluid (differential equation) model to describe our system. However, we note that it is straightforward to show that the stochastic version of the model would give the same results in an order sense, as we did in earlier work [12] . Also, all the simulations in this paper are conducted using a full stochastic model, and their accurate match with the fluid model further indicates its accuracy.
Let us explain the model through tracking the progression of a user. We term an initial user that wants, but has not yet attained, the content a Wanter (W). When a Wanter arrives to the system, it has two options: get content from the illicit P2P system for free or get content from the legitimate system for a price p. We assume that the Wanter wishes to obtain content as quickly and cheaply as possible, and so she first approaches the illicit P2P swarm and then only attains the content from the legitimate system if the content is not attained a reasonable time interval (one infinitesimal clock tick in our model) from the illicit P2P. This cycle repeats, if necessary, until the content is attained. In some sense, this is the worst-case for the legitimate provider since the illicit source is tried first.
Once the Wanter has attained the content, we assume the the Wanter acts strategically when deciding its next action. If a Wanter obtains the content legally, then the Wanter has three options: (i) It might decide to use the content to assist the illicit P2P swarm, i.e., go Rogue (R). We denote the probability this happens by ρ < 1. (ii) It might decide to assist the legitimate P2P swarm (if one exists) as a Booster (B). We denote the probability of this event by β < 1. Note that β = 0 if no legal P2P is used. (iii) Or, it may simply Quit(Q) and leave the system. If a Wanter obtains the content illegally the options are similar: it can either aid the illicit swarm as a Fraudster (F), or Quit(Q) and leave the system. We denote the probability that a Wanter that has obtained the content illegally becomes a Fraudster by κ < 1.
Note that the goal of revenue sharing is to incentivize Wanters to become Boosters after attaining content legally, rather than going Rogue. The hope is that the revenue invested toward reducing the number of "early adopters" that go Rogue keeps the illicit P2P swarm from growing enough to provide good enough quality of service to dominate the legitimate swarm.
To model this system more formally, we introduce the following notation. Let N w (t) be the number of Wanters at time t, i.e., the number of users who have not yet attained the content, and assume N w (0) = 0. Further, let N l (t) and N i (t) be the number of users with legal and illegal copies of the content at time t. The number of wanters at any time t satisfies the following equation
We can break this down further by noting that the number of Rogues, Fraudsters, and Boosters in the system at time t (denoted by N r (t), N f (t), and N b (t) respectively) is:
with ρ + β < 1. The rest of legal and illegal users leave the system. The key remaining piece of the model is to formally define the transition of Wanters to holders of illegal/legal content, i.e., the evolution of N i (t) and N l (t). However, this evolution depends critically on the model of the two systems, and so we describe it in the next section.
C. System models
We discuss in detail the illicit and legitimate system models below. The factors in these models are key determinants of the choice of a Wanter to get the content legally or illegally. When modeling the two systems, we consider a fluid model, and so the performance is determined primarily by the capacity of each system, i.e., the combination of the initial seeds and the Fraudsters/Boosters that choose to join (and add capacity). However, other factors also play a role, as we describe below. Throughout, we model the upload capacity of a user as being 1.
1) The illicit P2P system: There are two components to the model of the illicit P2P network: (i) the efficiency of the network in terms of finding content, and (ii) the initial size of the network and its growth.
Let us start with (i). To capture the efficiency of the P2P system, we take a simple qualitative model. When attaining the content illegally, a Wanter must contact either a Rogue or a Fraudster. We let η(t) capture the probability of a Wanter finding a Rogue or a Fraudster when looking for one instantaneous time slot. We will consider two cases: an efficient P2P and an inefficient P2P. In an efficient P2P, we model η(t) = 1, with the understanding the the P2P allows easy lookup of content and all content is truthfully represented. In contrast, for an inefficient P2P, we model
where recall that N is the total population size. This corresponds to looking randomly within the user population for a Rogue or Fraudster. Neither of these models is completely realistic, but we choose them with the goal of upper and lower bounding the true efficiency of an illicit P2P system. Next, with respect to (ii), we model the initial condition for the illicit network with N i (0) = 0, since the assumption is that the content has not yet been released, and therefore is not yet available in the illicit P2P swarm. From this initial condition, N i (0) evolves as follows:
The interpretation of the above is that N r (t) + N f (t) is the current capacity of the illicit P2P and η(t)N w (t) is the fraction of the Wanters (newly arriving and remaining in the system) that find the content in the illicit P2P network. The min then ensures that no more than the capacity is used.
2) The legitimate CDN: As discussed in the introduction, our goal in this work is to contrast the revenue attained by a CDN that uses P2P and revenue sharing with one that does not use P2P. Thus, there are two key factors in modeling the legitimate CDN: (i) the amount revenue sharing used, and (ii) the initial size of the CDN and its growth, which depends on the presence/absence of the legal P2P.
Let us start with (i). Suppose that the purchase price of a copy of the content is p. Hence, a user that wishes to obtain a legal copy of the content must pay the content generator the sum p through some kind of online banking system. We consider a simple model for revenue sharing where a user receives ϵp for each piece of content it distributes when taking part in the legitimate network as a Booster. Thus, ϵ = 0 corresponds to no revenue sharing. Note that this could potentially be implemented on a system such as BitTorrent by simply keeping track of amount uploaded by each peer 3 . The value ϵ can be viewed either as a share of the revenue from each download or as the expected payoff of a lottery scheme operated by the CDN.
Intuitively, κ is fixed regardless of ϵ, since once a Wanter gets the content illegally, whether it becomes a Fraudster or not is independent of revenue sharing. The key consequence of revenue sharing is on the "rogue factor" ρ. We make the assumption ρ + β = κ.
By fixing ρ+β, we are assuming that the likelihood of a user joining a P2P swarm (either legal or not) is fixed irrespective of ϵ and only which P2P swarm is joined is affected by revenue sharing. The idea is that increased revenue sharing should limit the likelihood of a Wanter going rogue after attaining the content legally. It is difficult to predict the exact impact of this effect; however to qualitatively capture this, we model ρ as a decreasing function of ϵ, ρ = κϕ(ϵ), 3 BitTorrent Trackers already collect such information in order to gather performance statistics.
where ϕ(.) is a decreasing function with ϕ(0) = 1 and ϕ(1) = 0.
Next, with respect to (ii), unlike for the illicit P2P swarm, the legitimate network does not start empty. This is because it has a set of dedicated servers at the beginning which are then (possibly) supplemented using a P2P network. We denote by C N be the capacity of the dedicated CDN servers when the total population size is N . Note that this capacity must scale with the total population size to ensure that the average wait time for the users is small. As shown in [11] , a natural scaling that ensures no more that O(ln ln N ) delay is to have the capacity C N = Θ (N/ ln N ). Based on this, we adopt C N = N ln N in this work. . Additionally, we assume N l (0) = 0.
Given these initial conditions, N l (t) evolves as follows:
The interpretation for the above is that if there are a positive number of Wanters remaining in the system, then the full current capacity of the CDN can be used to serve them, i.e., C N + βN l (t).
III. RESULTS
Given the model, we can now investigate the impact "revenue sharing" has on the revenue attained by the CDN. The goal of the work is to highlight that the revenue shared serves as an "investment" which pays itself back many times over as a result of the damage it causes to the capacity/performance of the illicit P2P network.
To characterize the revenue attained by the CDN, we use the fractional revenue attained, which is defined as follows:
Definition 1: The fractional revenue, R, attained by the CDN is defined as
Recall that T ∞ is the final point of time in the evolution of demand, and so this can be interpreted as an approximation 4 of the revenue attained by the CDN divided by the maximal revenue the CDN could have achieved.
Using this metric, we look at the impact of revenue sharing in two settings: when the CDN competes against inefficient illicit P2P sharing and when it competes against efficient illicit P2P sharing. Recall, that our models for these two cases are meant to serve as upper and lower bounds on the true efficiency of an illicit P2P system.
Note that the theorems stated below characterize only the asymptotic growth of the fractional revenue. However, the proofs of these theorems, presented in Appendix A, actually characterize the exact growth. Let us first consider the case of an inefficient, illicit P2P. Theorem 1: Let ρ + β = κ and ρ = κϕ(ϵ). The fractional revenue attained by the content provider in the presence an inefficient, illicit P2P is
Further, when ϵ = 0,
The interpretation of this theorem is striking. When no revenue sharing is used the fractional revenue attained by the content provider is exponentially small, Θ ( ln ln N ln N ) . However, when revenue sharing is used, the fractional revenue grows by orders of magnitude. Further, as we show later in this section, despite the asymptotic nature of the result the qualitative insight is visible even in finite, discrete systems.
Next, let us consider the case of an efficient, illicit P2P system.
Theorem 2: Let ρ+β = κ, with ρ = κϕ(ϵ). The fractional revenue attained by the content provider in the presence an efficient, illicit P2P is
Again, the the impact of revenue sharing in Theorem 2 is striking. The fraction of revenue obtained by the content provider rises by an order of magnitude when revenue sharing is used. Interestingly, the efficiency of the illicit P2P does not impact the asymptotic order of the fractional revenue when revenue sharing is not used, since in both the efficient and inefficient case it is Θ ( ln ln N ln N ) . However, the efficiency of the illicit P2P does affect the fractional revenue attained by revenue sharing. In particular, it causes a 1 − ϕ(ϵ) factor change in the fractional revenue attained; however this has almost no effect on the asymptotic growth. So, the benefits of revenue sharing are robust to the efficiency of the P2P system.
Since Theorems 1 and 2 rely on a fluid model, consider only a static number of users, and characterize only the asymptotic growth rate of the fractional revenue and the optimal revenue sharing, we present numerical simulations to verify the qualitative insights in discrete, stochastic systems with finite N , and a Bass diffusion model for interest.
To simulate the underlying discrete stochastic system, we assume time is discrete and that there are N = 100, 000 users in the system. At each time slot, each user picks a Poisson distributed number (with mean 1) of other users to spread interest to. The server has a FIFO policy with service rate C = 8000 ≈ N/ ln N .
It is difficult to predict the exact form of ϕ(ϵ); however to qualitatively capture this, we use the specific form
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the case of an inefficient illicit P2P system with and without revenue sharing. We use κ = 0.75, ϵ = 0 in the no revenue sharing setting ( Figure  3(a) ) and ϵ = 0.1 in the case of revenue sharing ( Figure  3(b) ). We also assume
In the case of no revenue sharing, the number of legal users eventually present in the system is 63, 000. In the revenue sharing setting, the final number of legal users in the system is 88, 888. The simulation results validate the insights obtained from our theoretical analysis. The key point in this figure is that even when the illicit P2P is extremely inefficient, there is significant revenue that can be gained from revenue sharing. In fact, the fractional revenue increases by more than 25%.
Next, we move to the case of an efficient illicit P2P. Figures  4(a) and 4(b) illustrate the case of an efficient illicit P2P system with and without revenue sharing. We use κ = 0.4, ϵ = 0 in the no revenue sharing setting (Figure4(a) ) and ϵ = 0.25 in the case of revenue sharing (Figure 4(b) ). In the case of no revenue sharing, the number of legal users eventually present in the system is 23, 153.In the revenue sharing setting, the final number of legal users in the system is 89, 151.The key point here is that when the illicit P2P is efficient, the gain from revenue sharing increases. In particular, the gain perceived by the content provider in terms of fractional revenue is over 180%. Note that this detailed contrast was not evident in the asymptotic results in Theorems 1 and 2.
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates the impact of the amount of revenue sharing on the fractional revenue ratio of the CDN in the cases of inefficient and efficient illicit P2Ps. We use κ = 0.75 in the simulation. The key point to observe in the figure is that there is a clear optimal amount of revenue sharing for the provider. In both cases, this amount is fairly small, however, it is clearly desirable to share more revenue in the presence of an efficient illicit P2P than in the presence of an inefficient illicit P2P. In fact, sharing nearly zero percent of the revenue still provides fairly close to the optimal fractional revenue in the inefficient case, while one must share more than 10% of the revenue to be near-optimal in the case of an efficient, illicit P2P.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our goal in this paper is to quantify the ramifications of coopting legal P2P content sharing, not only as a means of reducing costs of content distribution, but, more importantly, as a way of hurting the performance of illegal P2P file sharing. The model that we propose internalizes the idea that demand for any content is transient, and that all content will eventually be available for free through illegal file sharing. The objective then is not to cling to ownership rights, but to extract as much revenue from legal copies as possible within the available time. We develop a revenue sharing scheme that recognizes the importance of early adopters in extending the duration of time that revenue may be extracted. In particular, keeping users from "going rogue" (becoming seeds in illegal networks) by allowing them to extract some revenue for themselves (and so defray part of their expense in purchasing the content in the first place), provides order sense improvements in the extractable revenue. We realize that our paradigm is contrary to the "conventional wisdom" of charging more rather than less to early adopters, and also to discourage file sharing using legal threats. However, as many recent studies have demonstrated, incentives work better than threats in human society, and adoption of our revenue sharing approach might result in a cooperative equilibrium between content owners, distributors and end-users. Future work includes a characterization of the exact value of users based on their times of joining the system, as well as considering content streaming, which requires strict quality of service guarantees.
Before stating the results, we introduce a few notation. Let
Also, defineτ
Finally, we are ready to define the bounding processes used in the proof,N l (t) andN i (t).
Similarly, letN l (0) = N l (0) and
To state the result, we use a bit more notation about these processes:
We can now state our result characterizing the number of legal and illegal users.
Lemma 3: Let ρ+β = κ. In the presence of an inefficient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal users at the end of evolution is
where equality holds when β = 0. Proof: Recall that the efficiency factor of an inefficient illicit P2P, η(t), is given by
The second equality follows from (5) and (6) . From (8), the illegal growth rate is
(a) follows from the definition of η(t) and the fact that N w (t) ≤ N . (b) follows from (20) and (4) . From equation (9), the growth rate of legal users is given by
Let U (t) be the total copies of the content in the system. Then, U (t) = N l (t) + N i (t). Now, we claim that,
and the equality holds when β = 0. The proof is as follows: We can derive dNi dU and dNi dŪ from the pair of equations (21), (23) and (17), (18) respectively. Then, it can be shown that
and the equality holds when β = 0. Note that the range space of functions U (t) andŪ (t) are identical. Since, the initial values N i (0) andN i (0) are equal by definition, we get the result in (24) . Now, we deriveN l (t). Letτ be the time at which the number of wanters in the system vanishes to zero. Then, (18) and (17), for t ∈ (0,τ ], we get,
(f) follows from the fact that ρ + β = κ and the definition of U (t).
The above differential equation is in the form of a standard Riccatti equation, and it's solution can be written as
where ∆θ = θ 1 − θ 2 . θ 1 , θ 2 and b are given by equation (15) . From the relation,Ū (τ ) = N , we get (16) . Now, from (18), for t ∈ (0,τ ], we get
A lower bound on the solution of the above differential equation is provided by Lemma 7 in Appendix C. From (15) and (16) , it is clear that b > 1 andτ > ln b/∆θ. Then, by evaluating (36) at t =τ withN l (0) = 0, we getN l in (19) . Also, when β = 0, the lemma yields an exact solution of the above differential equation. Hence proved.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 3, the inequality is exact in the case of β = 0. Additionally, in this case, the form of N l (T ∞ ) simplifies.
Corollary 4: Let β = 0. In the presence of an inefficient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal users is given by
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and illegal users precisely, attaining the statement in Theorem 1 is accomplished by studying the asymptotics of the results in Lemma 3 and Corollary 4.
To begin, recall from (10) that the revenue ratio is
whereN l is defined by (19) . Following a few algebraic steps, from the above equation and the fact that β = κ(1 − ϕ(ϵ)), we get that
and R ∈ Θ ( ln ln N ln N ) if ϵ = 0, which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 parallels to that of Theorem 1; therefore, due to space constraints we provide only a sketch of the proof in this section.
We mimick the approach of the proof of Theorem 2 and define two processesN l (t) andN i (t) that bound N l (t) and N i (t) and analyze these processes. Importantly, the bounding processes are equivalent to the original processes when β = 0, i.e., the case of no revenue sharing. Lemma 5: Let β + ρ = κ. Then, in the presence of an efficient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal users is given by
and the equality holds when κ = ρ. The proof of this lemma is too long to fit in the space provided, however its structure parallels that of the proof of Lemma 3 in the proof of Theorem 1.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 5, the inequality is exact in the case of β = 0. Additionally, in this case, the form of N l (T ∞ ) simplifies. .
We obtain M from the initial conditions, then apply the above result in (38) to get (36). Also note that, when β = 0, (39) hold equality and hence (36).
